A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy by
A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy is a deliberately compact introductory work aimed at junior seafarers, those who make decisions affecting the sea services, and those who educate seafarers and decision-makers. It introduces listeners to the main theoretical ideas that shape how statesmen and commanders make and execute maritime strategy in times of peace and war.
Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945 by
Learning War examines the U.S. Navy's doctrinal development from 1898–1945 and explains why the Navy in that era was so successful as an organization at fostering innovation. A revolutionary study of one of history's greatest success stories, this book draws profoundly important conclusions that give new insight, not only into how the Navy succeeded in becoming the best naval force in the world, but also into how modern organizations can exploit today's rapid technological and social changes in their pursuit of success.
Mars Adapting: Military Change During War by
Future naval leaders need to embrace continuous assessment during wartime and create the conditions in order to support organizational learning and the need to adapt. Wars are usually won by the best learners and adapters, not the military with the best technology or best forecasted pre-war doctrine. To be able to learn quickly, leaders at all levels must be open to new conceptions of tactics and technologies and avoid locking into mentalities from prior experiences that block adaptation.
Military Agility by
The need to quickly enter into conflict and succeed in the initial engagements is an enduring demand on militaries around the world. Given today's dynamic geopolitical environment, the concept of successful, rapid transition or organizational and mental readiness is more relevant than ever. Using the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as a case study, Meir Finkel explores four important but generally neglected challenges of a swift transition from peace to wartime operations.
Military History for the Modern Strategist: America's Major Wars Since 1861 by
In this timely book, esteemed military expert Michael O'Hanlon examines America's major conflicts since the mid-1800s: the Civil War, the two World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. O'Hanlon looks for overarching trends and themes, along with the lessons for the military strategists and political leaders of today and tomorrow.
Military Strategy: A Global History by
Strategy has existed as long as there has been organised conflict. In this new account, Jeremy Black explores the ever-changing relationship between purpose, force, implementation, and effectiveness in military strategy and its dramatic impact on the development of the global power system. This book is a global account of military strategy, which examines the practices, rather than the theories, of the most significant military figures of the past 400 years.
On Flexibility by
This book addresses one of the basic questions in military studies: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises—ones that leave them vulnerable to new weapons systems and/or combat doctrines? Author Meir Finkel contends that the current paradigm—with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out effort to predict the nature of the future battlefield and the enemy’s capabilities—generally doesn’t work.
Organisational Learning and the Modern Army by
This book analyses the organisational processes and activities which can help improve tactical- and operational-level learning through case studies of lessons learned in two key NATO armies: that of Britain and of Germany. Providing the first comparative analysis of the variables which facilitate or impede the emergence of best practice in military learning, it makes an important contribution to the growing scholarship on knowledge management and learning in public organisations.
U. S. Naval Gunfire Support in the Pacific War: A Study of the Development and Application of Doctrine by
On November 20, 1943, the U.S. military invaded the Tarawa Atoll of the Gilbert Islands as part of the first American offensive in the Central Pacific region during World War II. This invasion marked more than one first, as it was also the introductory test of a doctrine developed during the interwar years to address problems inherent in situations in which amphibious assaults required support by naval gunfire rather than land-based artillery. In this detailed study, Donald K. Mitchener documents and analyzes the prewar development of this doctrine as well as its application and evolution between the years 1943-1945.
