Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: the U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006 by
The publication of a new counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine manual in late 2006 was widely heralded as an indication that the U.S. military was finally coming to understand the problems it has recently faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this interpretation assumes a tight linkage between doctrine as written and operations as actually conducted. By comparing modern counterinsurgency doctrine and operations to those of 1960s, this paper tests and ultimately disproves this proposition. An examination of COIN doctrine and operations in the 1960s reveals that operations seldom matched written doctrine.
Doctrine Smart Book by
The Doctrine Smart Book is a concise collection of Army doctrine summaries
that reflects current approved doctrine and is prepared by the Combined
Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The principal audience for the Doctrine Smart Book is all readers of
doctrine—military, civilian, and contractor.
Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945 by
Learning War examines the U.S. Navy's doctrinal development from 1898–1945 and explains why the Navy in that era was so successful as an organization at fostering innovation. A revolutionary study of one of history's greatest success stories, this book draws profoundly important conclusions that give new insight, not only into how the Navy succeeded in becoming the best naval force in the world, but also into how modern organizations can exploit today's rapid technological and social changes in their pursuit of success. Trent Hone argues that the Navy created a sophisticated learning system in the early years of the twentieth century that led to repeated innovations in the development of surface warfare tactics and doctrine.
Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook by
This comprehensive volume provides a thorough overview of 20th- and 21st-century military doctrines worldwide.
The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations by
In The Military Lens, Christopher P. Twomey shows how differing military doctrines have led to misperceptions between the United States and China over foreign policy―and the potential dangers these might pose in future relations. Because of their different strategic situations, histories, and military cultures, nations may have radically disparate definitions of effective military doctrine, strategy, and capabilities. Twomey argues that when such doctrines―or "theories of victory"―differ across states, misperceptions about a rival's capabilities and intentions and false optimism about one's own are more likely to occur. In turn, these can impede international diplomacy and statecraft by making it more difficult to communicate and agree on assessments of the balance of power.
NATO AJP-01: Allied Joint Doctrine, Edition E Version 1 by
Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(E), Allied Joint Doctrine is the capstone NATO doctrine for Allied joint operations. It explains the strategic context for such operations and focuses on the underlying philosophy and fundamentals of joint operations.
Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War by
This is the first study to use a comparative framework to understand what happened with the U.S. military endeavor in Somalia and the British effort in Bosnia up to 1995. Both regions were potential quagmires, and no doctrine for armed humanitarian operations during ongoing conflicts existed at the outset of these efforts. After detailing the impact of military culture on operations, Cassidy draws conclusions about which military cultural traits and force structures are more suitable and adaptable for peace operations and asymmetric conflicts. He also offers some military cultural implications for the U.S. Army's ongoing transformation.
The Roots of Military Doctrine: Change and Continuity in Understanding the Practice of Warfare by
This monograph examines military doctrine and explains why understanding its evolution and the influences that shape it are of vital importance to military practitioners, strategists, and statesmen alike. Doctrine, defined herein as the expression of a military's institutional 'belief system,' constitutes a significant yet hitherto unrecognized means by which this belief system can be understood and evaluated. This understanding and evaluation is in turn important because it is this belief system that determines the way a military fights, the relationship it will have with the state and society that sustain it, and its institutional culture. To get the belief system right means good strategy, victory, stable civil-military relations, and organizational wellbeing. Getting it wrong means sub-optimal strategy and operational outcomes or even defeat, strained civil-military relationships, and organizational dysfunction. This is why it is vital that military practitioners, strategists, and statesmen all have a well-developed understanding of this belief system and its implications. Yet currently, many do so only subconsciously, if at all. The aim of this monograph is to help make this understanding explicit.
The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK by
In The Soul of Armies Austin Long compares and contrasts counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army.Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author's personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Soul of Armies demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.
The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars by
Barry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy-that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security. Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military resources with political aims, and the degree of military or operational innovation it contains. He then examines these components of doctrine from the perspectives of organization theory and balance of power theory, taking into account the influence of technology and geography.
Warfighting: The U.S. Marine Corps Book of Strategy by
Warfighting is an authentic American philosophy of action that will thrill the millions of fans of SunTzu's The Art of War and Musashi's T he Book of Five Rings. This modern classic of strategy and philosophy is the quintessential guide to prevailing in competitive situations, be it war, work, play, or daily living.
Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military by
How and when do military innovations take place? Do they proceed differently during times of peace and times of war? In Winning the Next War, Stephen Peter Rosen argues that armies and navies are not forever doomed to "fight the last war." Rather, they are able to respond to shifts in the international strategic situation. He also discusses the changing relationship between the civilian innovator and the military bureaucrat.
